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Introduction
Since the Second Congo War (1998–2003), the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and Congolese civil society have 
attempted, with the support of international 
partners, to tackle consecutive cycles of armed 
mobilization. Amidst other peace efforts, a key 
strategy has always been the DDR of combatants. 
The first DDR programme began in 2003. Assisted 
by NGOs and mainly financed by the World 
Bank, the Commission nationale de désarmement et 
réinsertion (CONADER, National Disarmament 
and Reinsertion Commission) was mandated to 
facilitate ex-combatants’ return to civilian life. 
Although former DDR programmes had little 
success—the Kivu provinces alone currently count 
more than 70 armed groups1—the Plan global 
national de DDR III (Global National Plan for DDR 
III) was adopted in 2014 and, after a long row over 
finance and programming, was finally implemented 
in 2015. 
While DDR is considered to be a key part of 
post-conflict policies that are meant to assist 
in the re-establishing of peace and stability, the 
‘post-conflict’ label does not apply to the DRC. 
The eastern part of the country continues to face 
myriad intertwined conflicts—spells of pervasive 
violence alternate with periods of relative calm. 
The defeat of the Mouvement du 23-mars (M23, March 
23 Movement) in late 2013 opened a window of 
opportunity for demobilization. Military offensives, 
however, have regained momentum, flanked by a 
parallel, army-led demobilization effort. The role of 
this effort within DDR III is not clear.
This briefing analyses why and how previous DDR 
processes have failed, and provides a sketch of 
the current state of affairs and future prospects 
for demobilization. It reviews the impact of 
Key points 
•	 In	2015	the	Congolese	government	initiated	
its	third	major	national	disarmament,	
demobilization	and	reintegration	(DDR)	
programme	(DDR	III),	in	order	to	reintegrate	
Congolese	ex-combatants	into	civilian	life.
•	 	DDR	III	is	facing	certain	challenges.	Military	
operations	against	various	armed	groups	are	
continuing	and	discourage	some	combatants	
from	demobilizing.
•	 	The	political	roots	of	armed	mobilization	
remain	largely	unaddressed,	casting	
significant	doubt	on	whether	DDR	III	can	
ultimately	motivate	armed	group	members	
to	renounce	life	under	arms.
•	 	Despite	improvements,	the	involvement	
of	national	and	local	authorities	and	other	
interested	parties	is	still	relatively	modest,	in	
what	is	mostly	a	technical	approach	to	foster	
disarmament	and	demobilization.
•	 	For	DDR	III	to	have	lasting	success,	it	will	
need	to	be	more	closely	coordinated	with	
the	wider	political	and	security	context,	
including	the	scheduled	electoral	cycle,	for	
example,	and	the	reasons	for	the	persistence	
of	armed	groups.
FARDC	helmet	in	a	demobilization	transit	camp,	2014.
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CONADER and the potential of DDR III, focusing 
on the role of combatants, commanders and 
politicians. In particular, the briefing discusses 
incentives for armed groups to join demobilization 
programmes under conditions of high insecurity 
and distrust, as well as the relationship between 
demobilization and remobilization. The briefing 
argues that a holistic approach to DDR is needed, 
which would make it part of a genuine effort at 
social transformation and reform of the security 
sector, which in turn casts doubts on its feasibility 
within the current context of political competition 
and insecurity in the DRC.
Defining DDR
While the definition of DDR—which has long been 
a fashionable post-conflict reconstruction tool—
varies across countries, there are a few common 
characteristics. ‘Disarmament’ means removal of 
weapons and ammunition from combatants whilst 
the more complex ‘demobilization’ ranges from 
technical measures such as removing insignia up 
to very complex processes such as the disbanding 
of military hierarchies. ‘Reintegration’, in turn, 
is defined by the UN as a ‘process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status … with an open 
timeframe, primarily taking place in communities’. 
A related but different concept is ‘reinsertion’, here 
seen as ‘transitional assistance to help cover the 
basic needs of ex-combatants and their families’.2  
There are several ways to define the success 
or otherwise of DDR. In a narrow, technical 
sense, success means that former combatants 
are disarmed, demobilized and in some sense 
reintegrated into either regular security forces 
or civilian life. In a broader, political sense, it 
means contributing to overall peace and stability. 
This includes not only the technical elements 
described above but also the establishment of 
an environment in which ex-combatants are 
involved once more in social and political processes 
as civilians and wider political grievances are 
addressed. 
CONADER: ‘On juge l’arbre par ses fruits’ 
(‘A tree is judged by its fruit’)3
CONADER was set up in 2004, as stipulated in 
the 2003 Sun City Agreement that laid the basis 
for the creation of a new army, today’s Forces armées 
de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, 
Armed Forces of the DRC). CONADER was to 
organize the disarmament, identification and 
categorization of combatants, who could choose 
to either return to civilian life or integrate into 
the FARDC via the Structure militaire d’intégration 
(SMI, Military Integration Structure).4 While the 
belligerent factions listed 330,000 combatants, this 
figure was considered inflated and far exceeded 
the number of troops the government intended 
to integrate into the army. In orientation centres, 
people were disarmed and steered either to the 
army for brassage (literally brewing)—that is mixing 
with combatants from other factions—or listed 
for a demobilization process. CONADER and SMI 
started work in 2005, overseen by inter-ministerial 
commissions.5 Although it is intimately related to 
army integration,6 this briefing focuses primarily 
on the fate of DDR.
While initially DDR seemed to work, irregularities 
rapidly appeared. There were few prior social and 
economic assessments of those demobilized and 
their communities of origin. Often, communities 
were neither informed as to what was about 
to happen nor prepared to accommodate ex-
combatants. This exacerbated insecurity in areas 
that received a large influx of ex-combatants. 
Such areas began to see new land conflicts and 
economic pressure on communities intensified. 
Furthermore, DDR fostered the perception that 
joining a militia would lead to economic gains, 
as the demobilized received money and material 
supplies. The continuous availability of cheap 
weaponry increased opportunities to hand in old 
arms in exchange for money and to buy new ones. 
In addition, most of the recovered arms later 
disappeared, when individuals resold weapons to 
leaders of armed groups, thus helping to regenerate 
militias.7  
One of the reasons why DDR was at odds 
with realities on the ground was that much of 
CONADER’s strategy was based on the case of 
Sierra Leone, while home-grown expertise was 
ignored—only one staff member of the agency 
preceding CONADER was retained, for example.8 
The empty CONADER offices suggested a lack of 
direction and responsibility. Adding to that, poor 
knowledge of the context, in particular of security 
and social and economic conditions, was pervasive. 
Some of those demobilized for example received 
goats, which were immediately stolen by the rebels 
RECYCLING	REBELS?	DEMOBILIZATION	IN	THE	CONGO 3 
of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Rwanda). In another case, diesel grinding 
mills were handed out. Not only were they 
insufficient, some broke down and no spare parts 
were provided.9 In Kamituga, South Kivu, where 
the condition of the roads prohibits any cycling, 
CONADER partners were to distribute bicycles 
but ended up selling them privately. A Goma-based 
CONADER coordinator stole potatoes to resell 
them in Kinshasa.
With donors unwilling to assure oversight 
beyond provincial capitals and large towns, 
misuse of DDR assets reinforced distrust among 
target populations. While it was suspected that 
embezzlement involved the most senior staff, an 
evaluation became impossible after CONADER’s 
headquarters in Kinshasa burnt down.10
The payment of allowances to beneficiaries 
sometimes included non-combatants pretending 
to be former fighters. This saw many of them re-
entering DDR multiple times, a strategy that was 
made possible by the lack of a central database. 
At the same time, many remotely located ex-
combatants were never able to access any DDR 
programme and were largely abandoned by the 
official process. In Mwenga and Shabunda, South 
Kivu, many of those who were self-demobilized 
went to work in mining sites such as Kamituga or 
Lugushwa. Some would eventually rejoin militias 
such as the Raia Mutomboki. When asked why 
they remobilized, ex-combatants often emphasized 
that promises made to them were not kept. In the 
words of one ex-combatant: ‘We feel betrayed. We 
were demobilized by CONADER and CARITAS 
said they would help, but nothing. Some of us 
became bandits, others joined armed groups 
again.’11 A DDR official added, ‘If someone quits, 
they have to be taken care of, otherwise they will 
become thieves’.12 
Challenges to successful demobilization 
The experiences of CONADER hint at a number 
of obstacles and risks to lasting and successful 
DDR in the Congo. There are four main factors 
that impede a smooth rollout of DDR and affect 
patterns of mobilization: local security dilemmas 
between and within communities; resistance by 
elites with political agendas; perverse incentives 
for commanders; and social processes among rank-
and-file ex-combatants, which lead them to be 
recycled as rebels.  
Local security issues 
In most of the conflicts in the eastern Congo, 
competition over land, livelihoods, identity and 
power creates security dilemmas for armed groups 
that impede DDR. An armed group may only be 
willing to lay down arms if its opponents do the 
same. Entering DDR thus requires armed groups 
to take a leap of faith—and if DDR fails, this faith 
is lost. 
Due to such security dilemmas, many militias 
refuse to disarm or join regular security forces, 
claiming to be protecting their communities 
against domestic and foreign threats. Others 
who did demobilize, re-mobilized as adversaries 
did so too.13 In the Bafuliiru Chiefdom in Uvira, 
South Kivu, for instance, insecurity continues due 
to the activity of numerous Mai-Mai groups and 
local tensions over customary power.14  The Forces 
d’autodéfense locales et légitimes (FALL, Local and 
Legitimate Self-Defence Forces) operating in this 
area, also known as biloko (‘things’ in Lingala), 
justify their presence by invoking local insecurity, 
which they say they need to address, given that 
neither the army nor the police are able to secure 
this vast mountainous territory. ‘Security is non-
existent. If, in certain destroyed villages, people can 
live [again], it is thanks to the Local Defence. DDR 
III can only work if the Congolese government 
provides security to the population’,15 explained a 
leader of this militia group. 
Resistance by political elites
Without the political will of elites, DDR is 
impossible. In the eastern Congo, political 
manipulation both triggers armed mobilization 
and discourages combatants trust in DDR. Elites 
often exploit xenophobic fears and use militias to 
bargain for political posts. Elites—as opposed to 
individual combatants—stand to gain little from 
DDR. Through intermediaries such as customary 
authorities and businesspeople, political elites may 
invest capital to mobilize ex-combatants or supply 
them with weaponry. Customary chiefs, many of 
whom simultaneously hold political office, embody 
important ethnic, political and economic interests.16 
In various Raia Mutomboki factions, recruitment 
works through kinship, and commanders need 
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to consult chiefs and others instrumental in the 
arming of militias.17 In Bunyakiri, Kalehe, South 
Kivu, Raia Mutomboki considers a national 
parliamentarian its leader.18 Customary leaders 
can, however, also support demobilization, such 
as the case of the Raia Mutomboki factions of 
Nyanderema, Lukoba and Blaise in Nindja, Kabare 
in 2015. Getting chiefs and politicians on board is 
vital to the success of DDR.
Incentive structures for commanders
Integration into the army and receipt of a military 
rank used to be incentives for commanders of 
armed groups to leave the bush. Worryingly, some 
peace accords, along with the politicization of DDR 
even encouraged armed mobilization, as was made 
clear at the 2008 Goma conference.19 However, in 
the course of 2013 the government in Kinshasa 
abandoned wholesale integration of armed groups 
and the giving out of army ranks and positions 
to commanders. One reason for this change 
in approach was the detrimental effect on the 
military—the emergence for example of battalions 
cadre (battalions consisting only of higher-rank 
officers who were not operational and often had 
little training or education). Since it abandoned 
this policy, however, it remains unclear what 
the government has to offer to leaders of armed 
groups who are still willing to lay down their arms. 
Many high and mid-level commanders expect 
rewards similar to those they could have expected 
in the past, and therefore either openly refuse or 
covertly obstruct DDR programmes that lack such 
benefits.20 There is, therefore, a need to rethink 
the incentives for commanders in any future DDR 
initiatives. 
A revolving door for rank-and-file combatants
DDR programmes focus mostly on livelihoods. 
Social identity and status have thus far largely 
been ignored. During the Congo Wars, a whole 
generation of Congolese youth became accustomed 
to living the rebel lifestyle.21 Access to popular 
culture such as music, clothes or drugs, and the 
representation of militias as fearless fighters 
defending noble causes created a powerful draw 
for many young people. According to these 
romanticized accounts, a farmer has to work 
hard every day but a rebel can sit around and 
wait for his or her daily bread. Previous DDR 
programmes underestimated this and did not 
sufficiently support combatants’ efforts to redefine 
their social roles in a civilian environment.22 
Moreover, demobilization often meant a career for 
the fickle, while army loyalty was not rewarded. 
Such dynamics led numerous demobilized and 
reintegrated combatants to rejoin militias.23 Others 
simply played the game, temporarily joining DDR 
programmes and siphoning off material benefits 
but eventually returning to a life of arms.24 
Taken together, these four factors create major 
obstacles for DDR III, which is itself far from being 
free of other weaknesses and challenges.
DDR III: Prospects for the next 
generation
These obstacles notwithstanding, a new 
programme was presented in June 2014. Although 
ready on paper, DDR III could not start until late 
2015 when sufficient initial funding was secured 
through bilateral donors and the World Bank. By 
November 2015, more than a year after its launch, 
only half of the anticipated 25,000 recipients (ex-
combatants and host communities) were enrolled. 
Funding remains insufficient despite a World 
Bank pledge. It is unclear how funds have been 
disbursed—some officials claim to have received 
nothing. 
Besides being the first such programme to be 
preceded by an awareness-raising campaign, 
DDR III is also the first to insist on transferring 
combatants from their home turf to other parts of 
the Congo.25 However, this poses another major 
obstacle to participation. Those in the programme 
with families cannot simply leave for faraway 
DDR centres. The conditions in the centres also 
give cause for concern. Kotakoli, one of the transit 
centres in ex-Equateur province, was closed due to 
a lack of provision for healthcare and food, which 
resulted in more than 100 inmates starving to 
death. Kamina, in ex-Katanga, made the headlines 
as commanders attempted a mutiny, complaining 
that combatants were being deprived of medicine 
and food.26  Although UN contractors have begun 
building reinsertion centres in the military bases 
of Kamina and Kitona, in ex-Bas-Congo, they now 
face allegations of inefficiency. In sum, the most 
innovative part of DDR III—temporary relocation—
is proving to be one of the main obstacles, since 
RECYCLING	REBELS?	DEMOBILIZATION	IN	THE	CONGO 5 
reports of these incidents make their way back to 
eastern DRC and discourage potentially interested 
combatants.
With an uncertain electoral period ahead, time 
seems to be already running out for DDR III. What 
began with army-led awareness-raising across the 
Kivus now encounters myriad constraints. While 
certain militia members want to demobilize, 
others seek integration into the security apparatus 
instead—and officials do not always seem to 
make it clear to combatants what options they 
have within and beyond DDR III. In addition, 
accusations of the FARDC failing to protect the 
population and rampant insecurity makes militia 
leaders wary of laying down their arms. In other 
cases, the army’s carrot-and-stick approach—
progressing with offensives while preaching 
the mantra of DDR—did not produce results. 
This could clearly be observed among the Raia 
Mutomboki combatants in Bunyakiri. While certain 
combatants surrendered, others developed a more 
aggressive posture as they were dislodged from the 
Burhale-Shabunda road into and pushed adjacent 
forests.27 
Additionally, there is deep distrust among many 
combatants. Aside from fears of being relocated, 
they are either afraid of stigma at home or 
vengeance for their involvement in a conflict. 
Others are put off by the negative examples of 
those of their peers who have ended up dead or in 
jail. For example, former Raia Mutomboki leaders 
are under residential surveillance and one Mai-Mai 
leader was sent to military prison. Another Raia 
Mutomboki leader is allegedly not joining DDR 
because he owes money to an FARDC commander. 
Discouraging news about the treatment of Paul 
Sadala, Germain Katanga and Bede Rusagara—all 
former militia leaders—also spread rapidly.28 
In sum, two main dynamics currently impede a 
smoother rolling out of DDR III. Firstly, militias 
strongly distrust the programme—both for past 
failures and from fear of being relocated from their 
communities. Secondly, they distrust a government 
army that lures them into demobilization while 
continuing to carry out military operations. 
Neither MONUSCO nor other third-party actors 
have so far acted as an honest broker to resolve 
this tension.
Policy implications: The need for a new 
approach
DDR programmes—in the DRC and elsewhere—
are not just technical exercises. They are rather 
profoundly political processes. Despite this, none 
of the recent DDR programmes were preceded 
by much research. This has led to incorrect 
assessments prompting adverse reactions from 
combatants, commanders and associated elites. In 
particular, glossing over conflict dynamics and the 
politics of armed mobilization has reduced DDR 
in some contexts to a type of ‘cash for weapons’ 
programme, rather than an attempt at sustainable 
demobilization and reintegration.29 DDR III should 
therefore more actively involve ex-combatants and 
commanders, as advisors and examples, and should 
refer more to experts in Congolese civil society and 
government.
Political processes such as DDR also need a 
modicum of stability to work. One of the main 
ingredients of the continuing volatility in the 
eastern Congo is the deficient performance of the 
security services, which poses a major obstacle to 
DDR. Without a national army which is perceived 
as a neutral and capable security provider, security 
dilemmas and elite political bargains will continue 
to undermine DDR. There is thus a need for a 
serious, genuine and comprehensive reform of 
the security sector, which so far has not been 
tackled by Kinshasa and without which no DDR 
programme can ever hope to be effective. In 
addition, continuing military operations should 
be carried out only if they do not undermine 
demobilization efforts. If the FARDC tries to do 
both simultaneously, the result cannot be anything 
other than distrust. Restoring that trust in the 
government is crucial to success. Such a long-term 
process should therefore start at the outset by 
treating properly those who surrender.
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